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Abstract:  
This paper extends previous work by testing the financial distress costs hypothesis in 
the context of the UK, a contract-based distress resolution system, and by considering 
the role of private equity firms. Using a hand-collected dataset covering 115 public-
to-private buy-outs (PTPs) completed in the period 1998 to 2001 and 115 randomly 
selected firms that remained public, we find contrasting evidence to that for US PTPs. 
Consistent with the financial distress costs model, firms going private are more likely 
to have better asset collateralisation, have less debt and be more diversified. However, 
we also find that UK PTPs are more likely to be younger, experience poor stock 
market performance and be smaller than firms remaining public. In addition, PTPs did 
not have lower R&D, higher free cash flows. Our results therefore indicate that in the 
UK financial distress costs may not be central to the decision to go private.We also 
find that private equity providers are more likely to be involved in the process if the 
firm going private is more diversified, has a higher Q ratio and had been quoted for a 
shorter period of time and have lower board shareholdings. This suggests that private 
equity providers are more interested in growth prospects than potential financial 
distress costs.  
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Public-to-private buy-outs, distress costs and private equity 
 
1. Introduction 
A public-to-private transaction occurs when a publicly listed company experiences a 
management buy-out, or a management buy-in, with the company’s shares no longer 
being publicly traded. Going private removes a company from the monitoring 
mechanisms associated with public quotation. The traditional rationale for going 
private is the incentive realignment hypothesis associated with agency costs (Jensen, 
1986a; 1989). The change of organizational form bonds management such that they 
become unable to pursue the consumption of perquisites and sub-optimal investment 
strategies. In contrast, Opler and Titman (1993) argue that it is important to identify 
factors that may deter rather than encourage the going private decision. Increased debt 
plays a central role in going private transactions with high leverage being found to be 
associated with financial distress (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Opler and Titman 
(1993) propose that potential financial distress costs may deter firms from going 
private and hence the expected benefits associated with this form of organizational 
structure may not be realized. Both approaches were tested in the context of the US 
environment of the 1980s and it is not clear whether the findings hold for other 
periods and other institutional contexts. 
 
The US experienced an increase in going private deals in the early to mid 1980s, Lehn 
and Poulsen (1989) and Opler and Titman (1993). Opler and Titman (1993) report a 
substantial reduction in the number of going private transactions during the late 1980s 
but numbers increased sharply again from the late 1990s (Toms and Wright, 2005). 
The decision to go private has become more common in the UK since the late 1990s. 
Only 7 deals worth £390.2 million, accounting for 1% and 3.7% of deal numbers and 
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value respectively were completed in 1997 in the UK. By 1999, the annual number of 
PTPs had risen to 46, accounting for 7% of the market. In 2000, £9.3 billion worth of 
PTP transactions were completed, amounting to 39.2% of buy-out market value. The 
numbers had decreased to 33 by 2001, which accounted for 5.2% of UK buy-out deals 
but the funding involved, at £4.9 billion, still amounted to a quarter (25.1%) of market 
value. In addition, over the period, 1991-1997, 4.8% of total UK acquisitions 
involving publicly quoted companies were PTPs. During 1998-2000, the figure rose to 
23.7% with the figure increasing in each of these years. PTPs have continued to be 
important, involving larger deals over time. Although the US and the UK are typically 
categorized as part of the same Anglo-American corporate governance system (La 
Porta et al., 1997; 1998), they display important differences in a number of respects 
(Toms and Wright, 2005) which emphasises the importance of examining the 
different contexts. Of particular relevance here are differences in the process relating 
to financial distress and in relation to the role of private equity (venture capital firms) 
in the funding of management buy-outs.  
 
The bankruptcy process in the US, centred on Chapter 11 procedures, is court-based. 
Jensen (1989), writing in the US context, argues that the mechanisms put in place in 
leveraged buy-outs provide for the privatization of bankruptcy and the reduction of 
the financial distress costs associated with a court-based system. Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) find little evidence in their study of highly leveraged transactions in the US 
that Chapter 11 is either inefficient or costly, while Ferris and Lawless (2000) find 
that the costs of Chapter 11 bankruptcy are lower in firms with higher amounts of 
secured debt. In contrast, the UK system is contract-based with debt contracts 
allocating rights across creditors, how rights are enforced and how the resulting 
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incentives affect the behaviour of the distressed company and its creditors (Franks and 
Sussman, 2003; Citron, Wright, Ball and Rippington, 2003). The UK’s creditor-
oriented insolvency system concentrates control rights in the hands of secured 
creditors, and provides an environment for these creditors to exercise their strict 
priority rights. This approach arguably helps overcome inefficiencies brought about 
by creditor co-ordination failures experienced in court-based debtor-oriented regimes 
such as in the US (Armour and Frisby, 2001). To date, however, there has been no 
examination of whether potential financial distress costs may deter firms from going 
private in this institutionally different context of the UK.  
 
The involvement of private equity firms and their perspective on financial distress 
costs may have important implications for the characteristics of firms that go private. 
Private equity firms are typically interested in making investments where it will be 
feasible to exit within two to five years and achieve at least a minimum target rate of 
return and preferably more. This suggests that private equity firms’ concerns about 
financial distress costs are likely to be reflected in them making investments where 
they have downside protection but with some growth prospects. In the US, leveraged 
buy-out associations play a role as active investors, but their contribution of equity 
financing is typically a small minority of total buy-out funding although this may be a 
significant part of their personal wealth (Cotter and Peck, 2001). Further, Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) report that the median percentage value of post-buyout debt to capital is 
89.1%. While public-to-private transactions in the UK are also financed primarily by 
debt, equity constituted an average of 34.3% of the funding package of these 
transactions (CMBOR, 2003). The total value of public-to-private transactions over 
the period 1998-2001 was £21.4 billion. Given that some 70% of public-to-private 
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transactions in the UK were funded by private equity firms, these providers were 
supplying very large amounts of funding. The potential influence of this greater 
involvement of private equity firms in the UK in the consideration of distress costs in 
the going private decision has not previously been examined.  
 
This paper extends previous work first by evaluating the financial distress costs theory 
in the context of the UK, a contract-based system, and second by considering the role 
of private equity firms. The paper makes a number of contributions to the going 
private literature. First, this is the first study to analyze the links between potential 
financial distress costs and the decision to go private using data from the period 
covering the late 1990s to early 2001. Second, it is the first study to investigate these 
issues using UK data. Third, the paper is the first to examine the role of private equity 
firms in the decision to go private in the UK.  
 
We find that firms going private are more likely to be more diversified, to have poorer 
prior share price performance, to have been quoted for a shorter period, to be smaller 
and to have lower Q ratios than firms remaining public. Of the results, only those for 
the Q ratio and diversification are consistent with the financial distress costs model. 
However, the results for Q, diversification and prior stock performance are also 
consistent with the agency cost model.  Our evidence relating to private equity firms 
shows that they are more likely to be involved in public-to-private transactions where 
the firm is more diversified, have a higher Q and have lower board shareholdings 
prior to going private. These results show that, while private equity providers invest in 
somewhat riskier firms, they cover themselves by not getting involved with public-to-
private transactions that are likely to run the risk of potential financial distress costs.  
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the relevant literature 
and lays out the specific hypotheses to be tested. The third section explains the data 
and the models to be tested. Section four presents the results with section five 
reporting robustness checks. Section six develops the analysis by looking at the 
factors that influence the involvement of private equity providers in the funding of 
PTPs, section seven analyses the extent of actual financial distress and some 
conclusions are drawn in section eight. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
Public-to-private transactions have generally been analysed from an agency 
perspective. The agency model argues that going private will be beneficial if the 
present organizational form enables management to consume excessive perquisites or 
undertake non-optimal investment in projects that produce negative net present 
values. To resolve agency issues, PTPs are usually funded largely by debt.1 
Management become committed to repay the increased coupon on the debt which 
means that future cash flows cannot be used sub-optimally and hence agency costs are 
reduced. Debt providers will monitor covenants on the debt (Citron, Robbie and 
Wright, 1997) and if the interest on the debt is not paid, the debt providers could put 
the company into liquidation, with shareholders having little chance of  recovering the 
value of their shareholding (Citron, Wright, Ball and Rippington, 2003). This in turn 
will have potentially serious repercussions for the management because they usually 
increase the value of their equity holding post-PTP (Weir, Laing and Wright, (2004). 
                                                          
1 For example, during the period under study, 1998-2001, senior secured and 
subordinated mezzanine debt provided an average of 65.7% of the funding for all 
public-to-private deals in the UK. 
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As a result, the increased monitoring by bond holders and the management’s 
increased financial stake will militate against the consumption of perquisites and the 
policy of non-optimal investment in favour of the need to make profits.   
 
While most attention has been devoted to the agency model outlined above, for 
example, Jensen (1986a), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Kieschnick (1998) and Weir et al 
(2005a and 2005b), the possibility of financial distress has attracted limited interest. 
Financial distress costs can be either direct or indirect. Direct costs are those incurred 
by the legal and administrative process of liquidation or reorganization. Indirect costs 
refer to the costs associated with the difficulties of doing business. For example, Opler 
and Titman (1994) argue that customers, employees and suppliers all suffer if a firm 
experiences financial distress. A number of studies have attempted to quantify these 
costs. Weiss (1990) estimated direct financial distress costs to be around 3%-5% of 
the firm value at the time of distress. Altman (1984) estimated indirect costs to be 
around 25% of firm value and Andrade and Kaplan (1998) calculated them to be 
10%-20% of firm value. These figures suggest that indirect financial distress costs are 
not trivial.  
 
The essence of the financial distress costs model is that it is explicitly interested in 
explaining why firms may not go private rather than why they do go private (Opler 
and Titman, 1993). It argues that the decision to go private is affected by the potential 
costs of future financial distress. The model therefore discusses the characteristics that 
may militate against future success and concentrates on the sources of costs that will 
be incurred should the firm fail. The model is potentially important because it argues 
that the decision to go private represents a trade-off between the potential gains from, 
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for example, incentive realignment with the resultant reduction in agency costs, and 
the possible costs of financial distress. If financial distress costs are high, the potential 
gains from going private may not therefore occur.  
 
In this paper, the financial distress costs hypothesis is tested in relation to the 
following variables: free cash flow (growth prospects), asset collateralization, firm 
diversification, product uniqueness, debt, company size, prior stock performance and 
firm age.  
 
It is important to note that a number of the variables that explain potential financial 
distress costs are also common to the agency model and, even though the reasoning is 
different, they are predicted to have the same sign. We therefore refer to the agency 
arguments where relevant.  
 
The explanatory variables are now discussed and the hypotheses explained.  
(i) Free cash flows 
The agency model argues that if a firm suffers from high free cash flows, it will 
benefit from going private (Jensen, 1986a). Free cash flows represent cash that could 
be distributed to shareholders rather than being retained by management. However, 
the financial distress costs model views free cash flow as a growth proxy if it is 
deflated by the market value of assets (Opler and Titman, 1993). This is because the 
market value of assets equals the risk-adjusted sum of discounted cash flows and high 
cash flows now will mean lower cash flow growth in the future. Myers (1977) 
develops a model showing that, if a firm experiences financial distress, its growth 
options lose value. Thus high growth options imply high distress costs. As Maupin et 
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al. (1984) report, going private transactions are most likely to occur in mature 
industries, which implies that future growth opportunities are limited. High present 
free cash flow therefore indicates lower future free cash flow growth as profitable 
investment opportunities become harder to identify.  
 
The evidence relating to free cash flows is mixed. Maupin (1987) finds that firms 
going private had significantly higher cash flows than firms remaining public. She 
analysed a relatively long time span, 1972-1984, during which going private was 
relatively uncommon. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) also report a significant result for free 
cash flows but only for one of their four full sample equations. When they split their 
sample into two time periods, they find an insignificant result for the earlier period but 
significantly higher free cash flows in firms going private in the later period. This 
suggests that the relationship changes over time and that analysing long time series 
with cross-sectional methods of analysis does not identify the changing situation.  
 
Kieschnick (1998), however, shows that the relationship may be sensitive to the 
method of analysis. Using a weighted maximum likelihood estimator, he finds no 
relationship between free cash flows and the decision to go private, a result supported 
by Halpern et al (1999). Opler and Titman (1993) support this when they reported that 
the free cash flows of firms going private were not statistically different from those of 
firms remaining public. In the UK, Weir, Laing and Wright (2005a, 2005b) also find 
no evidence that free cash flows affect the decision to go private. This result mirrors 
Powell (1997) who finds that free cash flows do not affect UK merger activity in 
general. However, in spite of the mixed results, we propose that:  
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H1: the financial distress costs model predicts that firms with higher free cash flows 
are more likely to go private because of lower financial distress costs 
 
(ii) Asset Collateralization  
In contrast to the agency model, where it is used as a proxy for growth prospects 
(Opler and Titman, 1993; Weir et al., 2005a), the financial distress costs model 
regards Tobin’s Q as a measure of asset collateralization. This arises because, as 
Titman and Wessells (1988) argue, growth opportunities are intangible capital assets 
that cannot be collateralized. In addition, Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a model in 
which firms that have assets that are backed by tangible assets are more likely to take 
on extra debt. The extra debt helps to overcome the problem of information 
asymmetry, something which leads to investing in negative NPV projects as a result 
of managers having better information about the viability of projects than 
shareholders. Firms with significant intangible assets should therefore not take on 
extra debt because it cannot be covered by assets.  
 
Given that going private is a largely debt-financed transaction, the financial distress 
costs model predicts that firms with low Q ratios are more likely to go private because 
more of their assets are collateralized. This reduces the potential costs of future 
financial distress.  There is, however, limited evidence to support this argument. 
Titman and Wessells (1988) found no relationship between debt ratios and Q and 
Opler and Titman (1993) found that firms going private had lower Q ratios than those 
staying public in only one of the four equations they tested. They find no evidence 
that Q affects the probability of going private during the early 1980s but find that it is 
significantly lower for firms going private over the second half of the 1980s. Weir et 
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al (2005a) also find significantly lower Q ratios for firms going private in the UK. 
Thus, consistent with the financial distress hypothesis, we propose that high Q 
companies are less likely to go private because debt holders run a bigger risk if 
financial distress occurs: 
 
H2: the financial distress cost model predicts that firms with greater asset 
collateralization, lower Q, are more likely to go private because of lower financial 
distress costs 
 
(iii) Diversification 
From an agency cost perspective, diversification is driven by managerial self-interest 
as it may be associated with entrenchment, cross-subsidisation or increased reputation 
associated with the signal that the person is able to manage large complex 
organisations (Jensen, 1986a; Montgomery, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). From a 
financial distress costs perspective, more diversified companies are better able to 
spread risks and are less likely to experience financial distress costs (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). This is supported by Morck et al (1990) who find that firms going 
private are more likely to be more diversified. In addition, Liebeskind et al (1992) 
report that firms sell off assets and become less diversified after going private. 
Therefore, we hypothesise: 
  
H3: the financial distress costs model predicts that firms going private are more likely 
to be more diversified than firms remaining public because of lower financial distress 
costs. 
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(iv) Product Uniqueness 
From an agency cost perspective, firms with high R&D expenditures are more likely 
to suffer high agency costs and are more likely to go private because it is more 
difficult to monitor whether spending is on negative net present value projects or on 
investments that will generate a positive return for shareholders (Opler and Titman, 
1993).  
 
From a financial distress costs perspective, if a firm is supplying a relatively unique, 
specialized good or service, going out of business will impose high costs on 
customers, suppliers and workers (Titman, 1984). Consequently, for example, other 
firms will be less willing to become creditors in the event that the firm shows signs of 
financial distress. Titman (1984) proposes that R&D intensity is a useful proxy for 
product uniqueness because firms that compete in markets where there are close 
substitutes are likely to undertake less R&D because the expected advantages are less 
likely to be long lasting. Thus, given the association with product uniqueness, high 
R&D spending will increase the probability of financial distress costs. Opler and 
Titman (1994) reported that, in adverse trading conditions, leveraged firms that 
supplied relatively unique products performed worse. We therefore expect firms with 
low R&D expenditure to be more likely to go private because of the lower associated 
financial distress costs. Support for this view was reported by Opler and Titman 
(1993) who found firms with high R&D spending were less likely to go private. In 
addition, Kaplan (1989) found that leveraged buyouts were more likely to occur in 
mature industries which are associated with less R&D. Therefore: 
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H4: the financial distress cost model predicts that firms with low R&D expenditures 
are more likely to go private because of lower financial distress costs 
 
(v) Debt 
The extent that a firm has underused its debt capacity will affect the probability of 
going private (Jensen, 1986b). From an agency perspective, low utilization of debt 
means that a firm does not have the bonding pressures associated with the close 
monitoring of bondholders. From a financial distress cost perspective, firms with low 
debt may have greater capacity to take on further debt to fund the transaction. Firms 
with high debt are more constrained in this respect and are likely to have higher future 
financial distress costs were they to take on further debt to go private. However, 
Halpern et al (1999) found an insignificant difference in the debt utilization of firms 
going private and firms remaining public. Consistent with financial distress costs 
argument, however, we hypothesise: 
  
H5: the financial distress costs model predicts that firms going private are more likely 
to have lower debt utilization than firms remaining public because of lower financial 
distress costs. 
 
(vi) Company size 
From an agency perspective, if going private is being driven by the desire to realign 
interests, firms with the highest agency costs are most likely to go private. Agency 
problems are more likely to be most serious in large firms because of information 
asymmetries arising from the difficulties involved in monitoring management’s 
actions and a lack of ownership control resulting from the more diffuse nature of 
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shareholdings in large firms (Nuttall, 1999). With respect to a distress costs 
perspective, Novaes and Zingales (1993) argue that large firms are likely to 
experience higher distress costs because of the importance of implicit contracts in 
large organisations. Such contracts may be hard to enforce if a firm is experiencing 
financial distress. However, Opler and Titman (1994) find that small firms are more 
likely to suffer financial distress because they are either more likely to go bankrupt or 
lack access to capital. They also find that small firms suffer a greater fall in sales 
during periods of financial distress. In addition, a number of studies, including Warner 
(1977) and Ang et al (1982), show that there is an inverse relationship between the 
costs of bankruptcy and firm size. However, Weiss (1990) in a study of publicly 
traded corporations found no evidence of a scale effect to bankruptcy costs and Opler 
and Titman (1993) found an insignificant relationship between size and the 
probability of going private. Although the evidence is mixed, consistent with the 
financial distress costs model, we hypothesise: 
 
H6: the financial distress costs model predicts that larger firms are more likely to go 
private because of lower financial distress costs. 
 
(vii) Prior stock performance  
From an agency cost perspective, if firms going private have poorer stock market 
performance, this is evidence of higher agency costs and suggests that the firm is a 
candidate to be taken private (Halpern, et al., 1999). On the other hand, if it has better 
stock performance, this implies that there is a smaller chance of it incurring financial 
distress costs in the future. Therefore, the financial distress costs model predicts a 
different role for prior stock market performance. In terms of financial distress costs, 
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good performance prior to going private suggests that the firm is less likely to 
experience financial distress in the future. Hence: 
 
H7: the financial distress costs model predicts that firms with good stock market 
performance are more likely to go private because of lower financial distress costs. 
 
(viii) Firm age  
In terms of firm age, it has been argued that younger firms are more likely to be 
acquired (Nuttall, 1999). Owners may seek to list corporations precisely to facilitate 
an acquisition in order to maximize their gains since the market for public 
corporations is more competitive than that for private firms (Zingales, 1995). 
Executives in newly listed firms may become disenchanted with the market for 
various reasons, including scrutiny by analysts, if they perceive that the market 
undervalues the firm and if they are unable to raise finance as expected.  
 
In addition, younger firms may be more financially constrained and seek to be 
acquired in order to obtain financial synergies with established corporations. Younger 
quoted companies may be more at risk of financial distress or of going bankrupt as 
they face uncertainties about operating profitably in a market that can only be 
resolved after they have traded for a period of time (Jovanovic, 1982; Geroski, 1995). 
While these factors may encourage younger firms to seek to go private, the higher 
distress costs they imply are likely to make it more difficult for them to secure 
financial backing. Hence: 
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H8: the financial distress costs model predicts that older firms are more likely to go 
private because of lower financial distress costs. 
 
(ix) Interactive terms 
We also suggest that a number of interactions may influence expected relationships. 
Firms that have both a low Q and high free cash flows also have collateralisable assets 
and lower future growth prospects, both of which reduce the probability of financial 
distress costs. Opler and Titman (1993) find that the interactive term is significant and 
positive meaning that firms that combine low Q and high cash flows are more likely 
to go private.  Hence, it is hypothesized from a financial distress perspective that the 
interaction of Q and free cash flows will be positively associated with the probability 
of going private. In addition, it is hypothesized that there is an interaction between Q 
and diversification. The financial distress costs model also predicts this outcome 
because it represents more collateralised assets and a greater spreading of risk. We 
also analysed the direction of asset collateralisation over time. This was done by 
looking at the relative performance of Tobin’s Q over a period of two years. 
Consistent with the financial distress costs model, it is expected that firms going 
private will gave lower ratios, which indicates an increasing collateralization of assets.   
 
We also control for a number of other variables that may affect the decision to go 
private. First, we control for possible tax benefits. In the US, Kaplan (1989) shows 
that there are tax benefits to be gained by going private. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) also 
found some evidence that firms going private paid more tax than firms remaining 
public. Kieschnick (1998) also finds that there are tax advantages to going private. 
However, the UK evidence shows no evidence of tax advantages, possibly because 
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the tax benefits of financing debt are greater in the US than in the UK, Renneboog et 
al (2005). Consistent with this, Weir et al (2002) found insignificant tax differences 
between firms going private and those remaining public and Renneboog et al (2005) 
report an insignificant link between tax liability and wealth effects of going private.  
 
Second, we also control for board ownership. A number of studies including Maupin 
(1987), Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) and Weir, Laing and Wright 
(2005b) found that internal ownership was higher in firms going private. This is 
consistent with higher agency costs arising from potential management entrenchment. 
Board ownership may cause agency problems at both high and low levels. Low board 
ownership raises agency costs because of the lack of financial incentive effects and 
high ownership may result in entrenched management. Firms with high board 
shareholdings may be in a stronger position to resist private equity firms’ attempts to 
dilute their equity stake. 
 
2.3 The Role of Private Equity 
PTPS are financed by a combination of debt and equity. In relation to the equity 
element, PTPs may be financed with or without backing from private equity firms. 
According to the CMBOR database, those cases funded without private equity firms 
typically involve management (often founders) as the primary equity holders. Within 
the class of firms going private, we develop hypotheses to explain the extent to which 
private equity firms may seek to invest in PTPs that exhibit low potential financial 
distress costs. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the attitude towards 
financial distress costs between the two types of financier and that firms going private 
are therefore homogeneous in this respect. 
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If private equity providers are trying to reduce the chance of suffering financial 
distress costs, we expect that they will be more likely to be involved in PTPs that are 
more diversified. This reduces the chance of distress by spreading the firm’s risk 
across a number of sectors. For private equity firms, the saleability of assets reduces 
the risk of not achieving minimum target rates of return on their investment. Where a 
sale can be achieved at above the purchase price, this facilitates the repayment of debt 
and generates some return for the private equity firm. Those firms without private 
equity firm investors are less likely to be diversified, perhaps because these firms are 
dominated by founders who are still in post:   
 
H9: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved in PTPs that are more diversified than are non-private equity 
providers because of lower financial distress costs.  
 
If reducing the chances of financial distress is important, we expect that private equity 
providers are more likely to be involved in PTPs that have better stock market 
performance than other PTPs. This is because a better previous performance suggests 
less chance of future failure. In contrast, while non-private equity providers may be 
concerned to avoid failure, they may be more concerned about poor stock market 
performance reflecting the stock market’s undervaluation of the firm (Weir, et al., 
2005b). Thus: 
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H10: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved in PTPs that have higher stock market performance than are non-
private equity providers because of lower financial distress costs.  
 
The financial distress costs model predicts that private equity firms should be 
attracted to going private transactions that suggest the lowest likelihood of financial 
distress. We therefore expect that private equity firms are more likely to become 
involved in low growth PTPs, as measured by free cash flows, as growth is expected 
to be riskier.   
 
However, it may be argued that, of the firms going private, those with the highest 
growth prospects are more attractive to private equity providers than lower growth 
going private firms. Private equity providers seek to realise the gains on their 
investment with a relatively limited time period compared to non-private equity 
investors (Kaplan, 1991; Wright, Thompson, Robbie and Wong, 1995). Private equity 
providers will have contractual arrangements to exit the company within a few years 
and hence shorter-term growth prospects may be a more important consideration than 
the long-term viability of the business. In contrast, in the absence of a private equity 
investor, management as principal investors may have a longer time horizon and be 
under less pressure to achieve growth. 
 
Peacock and Cooper (2000) state that private equity providers typically aim to sell 
their shareholding within two to five years. In addition, Wright et al (1996) find that 
those private equity backed buy-outs that fail, do so sooner than is the case for non-
private equity backed cases but that the latter’s failure rate overtakes that of the 
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former by year eight after buy-out. CMBOR (2003) data, which effectively covers the 
population of UK buy-outs finds that on a vintage year comparison, the failure rates of 
private equity backed buy-outs are generally higher than for non-private equity 
backed buy-outs. For example, by June 2003 24.5% of private equity backed buy-outs 
completed in 1990 had failed compared with 17.3% of non-venture backed buy-outs 
(CMBOR, 2003). 
 
In order to be able to exit through an IPO, buy-outs need to have a ‘growth story’ to 
convince incoming investors to purchase the shares. Firms that have been constrained 
in realising their growth opportunities prior to buy-out may grow rapidly initially 
when such constraints are removed under the buy-out structure. The potential for 
expansion offered by the buy-out structure may require reversion to a listed 
corporation if the best use is to continue to be made of the assets (Wright, et al., 
1994). Fast growing buy-outs may also be attractive to strategic buyers seeking to 
build-up their market presence in focused activities. Buy-outs that have the highest 
growth prospects thus become attractive with respect to the two main exit routes. By 
exiting in a relatively short period of time, private equity firms can achieve higher 
internal rates of return (IRRs) on their investment than if they are forced to wait 
longer for the same realization value; this is important given the focus on IRRs as the 
benchmark for private equity firm performance (Manigart, et al., 2002).  
 
However, consistent with the financial distress costs hypothesis, we hypothesise that: 
 
H11: The financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved in PTPs that have lower growth prospects as measured by higher 
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free cash flow than are non-private equity providers because of lower financial 
distress costs.  
 
In terms of the financial distress costs model, asset collateralization may be an 
important factor.  Management and founders will be looking to protect their wealth 
and will therefore be keen to ensure that, in the event of financial problems, they will 
be able to generate as much excess from the assets as possible. Following the 
arguments outlined above, private equity firms may trade-off prospects for growth 
against collateralisable assets as they perceive that, should the firm fail, they are 
unlikely to receive repayment. Evidence from failed buy-outs suggests that even 
secured creditors on average receive little more than 60% of their lending (Citron, et 
al., 2003). However, consistent with the financial distress costs hypothesis, we expect 
that private equity providers are more likely than non-private equity providers to 
become involved in PTPs that have the greatest degree of asset collateralization, that 
is, a lower Q ratio. Therefore: 
 
H12: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved in PTPs that have a lower Q ratio than are non-private equity 
providers because of lower financial distress costs.  
 
High R&D spending also increases the chances of financial distress because it is a 
proxy for product uniqueness, something which imposes high costs on customers and 
suppliers. We therefore expect private equity providers to be more likely than non-
private equity investors to be involved in PTPs that have low R&D spending. In 
contrast, non-private equity investors may be more interested in cases with higher 
 23
R&D spending as this reflects their perception of growth opportunities that the market 
has failed to recognize. Hence:    
 
H13: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved in PTPs that have lower R&D spending than non-private equity 
providers because of lower financial distress costs.  
 
Given that it was argued earlier that larger firms have lower financial distress costs, 
private equity firms may be more interested in investing in such firms. In contrast, 
non-private equity providers, typically dominated by founders and management, may 
be relatively more able to exert more control over smaller firms in order to avoid 
distress. In addition, non-private equity investors with fewer resources and less 
prominent reputations among the financial community may face greater difficulties 
than private equity firms in funding larger firms. Hence:  
 
H14: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved with PTPs of larger firms than are non-private equity providers.  
 
It has also been argued that, given that firms are more likely to go bankrupt within the 
first three years of trading, potential financial distress costs become lower as firms get 
older. Hence, if the objective is to minimize financial distress costs, we expect private 
equity providers to be more likely to be involved in PTPs of older firms than are non-
private equity investors.  However, if disenchantment with the market is driving the 
management to take the firm private, we expect that non-private equity PTPs are more 
likely to become involved with younger firms. Thus: 
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H15: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved with PTPs of older firms than are non-private equity providers.  
 
Post-going private, firms will increase their debt. Firms with high current pre-going 
private debt levels will therefore increase this and be more susceptible to future 
financial distress costs given the commitment to service the higher debt. Firms with 
lower initial debt levels are less likely to experience this difficulty. Non-private equity 
investors may be associated with firms with lower levels of debt as they are likely to 
need to borrow more to fund the purchase as they are using very limited amounts of 
equity. Private equity firms may be able invest in relatively higher initial debt firms as 
they will be able to use more equity and quasi-equity funding to achieve their target 
rates of return.  Hence: 
 
H16: the financial distress costs model predicts that private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved with PTPs of higher debt firms than are non-private equity 
providers.  
 
It is also proposed that the Q1Q2 and the interactive terms LQ*HFCF and 
LQ*HDIVERSIFIED will affect the probability of private equity firm involvement. 
The lower the Q1Q2 ratio, the more collateralized the assets will become and hence 
the greater the probability of private equity firm involvement. Financial distress costs 
will also be lower with the combination LQ*HFCF, that is low Q and high free cash 
flows, and so is more likely to attract a private equity provider. The combination of 
low Q and greater diversification, LQ*HDIVERSIFIED, will offer greater asset 
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collateralization and a wider spreading of risks, hence reducing financial distress 
costs. 
 
As before, we also control for tax and ownership. Private equity providers are more 
likely to be involved in PTPs that offer greater potential for tax savings and hence 
potentially greater improvements in performance. Given that those cases funded 
without private equity firms typically involve management (often founders) as the 
primary equity holders, it may be argued that firms with high board shareholdings 
may be in a stronger position to resist private equity firms’ attempts to dilute their 
equity stake. In addition, low management shareholding firms may require additional 
equity capital in the post-PTP stage. Financial constraints on the management may 
mean that they have to seek the equity from outside providers rather than take on 
additional extra debt. Additional equity may be preferred to additional debt because it 
is cheaper. Therefore, private equity firms may be more likely to be involved in PTP 
transactions in which the incumbent management has the lowest shareholdings. 
 
3. Data and Model 
The data cover the period 1998-2001. Data on the public-to-private transactions were 
obtained from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) at the 
University of Nottingham. The sample consists of 115 PTPs for which data were 
available. We constructed a matched sample of 115 firms that remained public. There 
are two strands to the matching process, temporal and random. For each year of the 
sample, we have equal numbers of PTPs and randomly drawn firms remaining public. 
The matching was based on the methodology used by Ambrose and Megginson 
(1992) who argue that it allows comparisons without having to take account of trends 
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in ownership or financial structure and Halpern et al (1999) who maintain that it takes 
account of economy-wide factors. The methodology used, matching by sample size, is 
known as choice-based sampling and classifies the population into groups based on 
outcomes, Cosslet (1981). Choice-based sampling may be appropriate where random 
sampling would give a small number of cases falling into a particular category, 
Amemiya (1985). Relatively few firms, only around 2.05% of non-financial firms, 
changed their status from public-to-private so that, unless a randomly drawn sample 
was very large, random sampling would yield few companies making the change. 
This would create cost implications in relation to sample collection.  
 
Data for Tobin’s Q, free cash flow, size, debt, taxation and research and development 
were taken from Extel Primark Company Analysis. The diversification measure, 
entropy, was calculated from sales figures taken from Datastream. Board 
shareholdings data were obtained from the PriceWaterhouseCoopers Corporate 
Register. Data on firm age were taken from the Stock Exchange Year Book and Extel 
Primark Company Analysis. Prior stock performance was calculated using Datastream 
which provided details of firm share price performance and changes in the FTSE All 
Share Index. Stock performance was measured from one month prior to the date (t-1) 
of the announcement of the bid over the previous year (t-13). The time lag takes 
account of possible takeover rumours in the period before the bid was made public. 
Rumours of a bid are likely to increase the share price and so give a false impression 
of the stock’s performance prior to acquisition. Information on the date of the 
announcement of the bid was provided by Acquisitions Monthly and the Financial 
Times Intelligence Service. The data for the PTPs are at the date of the last published 
accounts, that is, the year before the PTP took place. The non-PTP sample’s data refer 
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to the same year. This ensures that the data for both groups are consistent in terms of 
time.  
 
The binary nature of the relationship means that logistic regression is an appropriate 
technique. The dependent variable, Yi, takes a value of one if the company goes 
private and zero if it remains public. Thus the initial model is: 
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(1) 
Consistent with the financial distress costs model, we hypothesise: 
β1<0, β2>0, β3>0, β4<0, β5<0, β6>0, β7>0, β8>0. 
 β 9 and β10 are control variables and no sign is specified a priori. 
We also run additional equations with β11Q1Q2, β12LQ*HFCF and 
β13LQ*HDIVERSIFIED. We expect β11<0, β12>0,  β13>0. 
 
The additional analysis investigates the likelihood of private equity providers being 
involved in a PTP compared to other financiers of PTPs. The new dependent variable, 
PEP, is defined as one if a private equity provider was involved and zero if not. The 
general model is: 
 
BoardshareTaxAgeSizermanceSharePerfo
DebtDRdDiversifieFCFQPEP
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 (2) 
Consistent with the financial distress costs model, we expect: 
β1<0, β2>0, β3>0, β4<0, β5>0, β6>0, β7>0, β8>0. 
β 9 and β10 are control variables and no sign is specified a priori. 
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We also run additional equations with β11Q1Q2, β12LQ*HFCF and 
β13LQ*HDIVERSIFIED. We expect β11<0, β12>0, β13>0. 
  
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
(i) Q is a proxy for Tobin’s Q. Halpern et al (1999) define it as the ratio of the market 
value of common stock to its book value. However, their numerator does not take 
account of a company’s debt and so does not represent a true measure of a firm’s 
value. We follow the approach of, McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Opler and 
Titman (1993) and define Q as the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity plus total 
debt minus cash in the balance sheet deflated by the book value of assets.   
(ii) FCF is cash flow in excess of that required to fund projects that have a positive net 
present value deflated by an appropriate variable. Opler and Titman (1993) define the 
numerator as operating income before interest, taxes and depreciation. However, as 
Halpern et al (1999) point out, excluding dividends gives an inaccurate picture of the 
extent of free cash flow. We take account of this and define free cash flow as 
operating cash flow minus interest, tax and dividends as a percentage of the market 
value of assets. The numerator is similar to that of Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and the 
market value of assets is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt, Opler and Titman (1993). 
(iii) DIVERSIFIED is defined in terms of the entropy measure. 



i
i s
s 1ln  where si 
is the share of a firm’s total sales of segment i and ln is the natural log.  
(iv) R&D is research and development expenditure as a percentage of sales.  
(v) DEBT is total debt as a percentage of total assets.  
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(vi) SHARE PERFORMANCE is the difference between the share’s performance and 
the Index’s performance over the year prior to the announcement of the bid. Share 
performance is the percentage change on the share price and the Index’s performance 
is the percentage change in the FTSE All Share Index. Halpern et al (1999) use the 
ratio of the share performance to index performance. However, a negative relative 
performance can be generated either by a negative share movement and a positive 
index change or by a positive share change and a negative index change. The former 
shows poor firm performance and the latter good firm performance, however both will 
generate a negative ratio. By using the difference in the two measures, this ambiguity 
is overcome. For example, if the share price fell 5% and the index rose 5%, the 
difference would be minus 10; if the share price rose 5% and the index fell 5%, the 
difference would be plus 10. In both cases the ratio would be minus 1, which implies 
poor performance. In order to calculate the non-PTP share performance, each was 
randomly allocated the same date as the bid announcement of one of the PTPs for the 
relevant year.  
(vii) SIZE is the natural log of total assets.  
(viii) AGE is the number of years quoted on the London Stock Market.  
(ix) TAX is the tax paid deflated by sales. 
(x)  BOARDSHARE is the equity ownership of the board of directors 
 
We also test three other variables. First, Q1Q2, which provides a measure of the 
direction of asset collateralisation (financial distress costs) over time. It is defined as 
the Q ratio in the year before going private (at the last published accounts) divided by 
the Q ratio in the previous year. Second, LQ*HFCF is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a firm had below median Q and above median free cash flow and zero 
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otherwise. Third, LQ*HDIVERSIFIED is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if a firm has below median Q and above median diversification and zero otherwise.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample of 115 PTPs and the 115 
randomly selected, but matched by year, firms that remain listed. The mean Q ratio is 
1.04. The mean Q1Q2 ratio shows that there was very little change in the Q ratios over 
the two years. There is evidence of a degree of diversification with the mean value 
being 0.29. Average free cash flow for the sample is 5.50% and the average debt is 
21.00%. The average size of firms is £899.49 million. On average firms spend 1.76% 
of sales on research and development. The average number of years quoted is 17.8. 
Share performance averages -121.77% over the period and average board 
shareholdings are 19.29%. The average tax paid was 2.47% of sales. In terms of the 
interactive terms, 26% combined low Q and high free cash flows and 27% had a 
combination of low Q and high diversification. 
Insert Table 1 
Insert Table 2 
Table 2 presents the univariate analysis of the characteristics affecting the decision to 
go private for the full sample. We find that firms going private had significantly lower 
Q ratios than firms remaining public. They also had lower Q1Q2 ratios   Firms going 
private also experienced poorer stock market performance during the year prior to 
going private. We find no difference in the mean free cash flows or in the interactive 
Q-free cash flow variable. Board ownership is not significantly different. We also find 
that PTPs are more diversified but the difference is not significant. However, the Q-
diversification interactive term is higher for firms going private. In contrast, research 
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and development spending is not significantly lower in firms going private. Firms 
going private were significantly smaller than firms remaining public. There is 
evidence that they had lower debt ratios but that they did not pay more tax. Finally, 
firms going private were significantly younger in terms of being publicly quoted.  
Insert Table 3 
The correlations reported in Table 3 show no signs of potential multicollinearity 
between the independent variables. In an additional test, we ran an OLS and found the 
range of Variance Inflation Factors to be 1.04 to 1.41, all well within the accepted 
limits. We therefore concluded that multicollinearity was not a problem. However, 
there were high correlations between Q and Q1Q2, 0.87; diversification and the 
diversification-Q interactive term, 0.49; and free cash flow and the free cash flow-Q 
interactive term, 0.44. These variables were therefore included in separate equations 
in the following tables. 
Insert table 4 
Four models are presented in Table 4. Model 1 is the basic model and models 2, 3 and 
4 include additional terms. In terms of the financial distress costs model, we find that 
firms going private are more likely to have significantly lower Q ratios than firms 
remaining public. They also have significantly lower Q1Q2 ratios. This indicates that 
the Q ratio was falling relative to firms remaining public and hence that assets were 
becoming more collateralized in the period prior to going private. The results also 
show that firms going private are likely to be significantly more diversified than firms 
that remain public. As hypothesised, firms going private are more likely to experience 
a combination of a low Q and a greater degree of diversification than firms remaining 
public. These results are therefore consistent with the financial distress costs 
hypothesis because they indicate that firms going private have more collateralisable 
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assets. There is also evidence that firms going private are more likely to become 
involved in transactions with lower initial debt. 
 
We also find no evidence that there are differences in the extent of free cash flows. 
Neither do we find that the interactive Q-free cash flow term is significantly different 
for the two groups of companies. Opler and Titman (1993) found a significant, 
negative relationship between the interactive term and the decision to go private. They 
included the interactive term in the same equation as their free cash flow variable. We 
ran a similar equation and also found a negative, and significant at the 10% level, 
relationship between the decision to go private and the Q-Free cash flow variable. 
However, as discussed above, the correlation between the interactive term and free 
cash flow was 0.44, which is high enough to suggest a multicollinearity issue so the 
Opler and Titman result should be treated with caution. Tax is also insignificant.  
 
In addition, contrary to expectations, firms going private are smaller than firms 
remaining public. Opler and Titman (1993) find that firms involved in US LBOs were 
smaller but the result was not significant.  This may be explained first by looking at 
the relative size of going private transaction in the UK and US. Opler and Titman’s 
figures for 1985-1990 (excluding a very high figure for 1989) show that the average 
size of a going private transaction was $282 million whereas in the UK our sample of 
PTPs, covering a much later period, 1998-2001, averaged £131 million (around $210 
million using £1-$1.60). Public-to-private transactions are therefore much smaller in 
the UK than in the US. Second, Opler and Titman only analyse the manufacturing 
sector whereas our non-PTP sample is randomly drawn from the whole economy. 
Third, it may also indicate that in the UK, firms going private tend to be younger and 
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hence smaller, which may suggest that management believes that the market does not 
accurately value the company.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
We undertook additional tests to investigate the role of a number of key variables. 
First, we looked at the measure of free cash flow. Halpern et al (1999) argue that 
deflating cash flow by sales is preferable to using the market value of equity because 
the latter’s value takes account of factors such as capital structure. This criticism 
implies that regarding free cash flow as a growth proxy, as the financial distress costs 
model does, is incorrect. Nevertheless, we deflated free cash flow by sales and found 
that it remained insignificant in all equations.  This result confirms the lack of 
importance that free cash flows play in UK going private transactions.  
 
Second, we use an alternative measure of growth, the percentage change in total 
assets. The growth of assets was negative and significant at 1% suggesting lower 
growth prospects for firms going private. Third, to assess the effects of size, we 
replaced assets with market capitalization and sales. Both were also negative and 
significant. The initial results are therefore robust to variable definition.2   
 
6. Role of Private Equity 
As discussed earlier, we assess the extent to which the private equity providers 
become involved with PTPs that have potentially low financial distress costs. In this 
analysis, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the going private transaction 
involved private equity funding and zero if it did not. The sample comprised 81 PTPs 
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that involved a private equity provider and 34 PTPs that did not. The results are 
reported in table 5.  
INSERT TABLE 5 
The results in Table 5 offer limited support for the financial distress costs explanation 
of private equity involvement. The positive diversification coefficient is consistent 
with the financial distress model and shows private equity providers being involved 
with PTPs in which risks are spread across a number of sectors. This provides private 
equity providers with opportunities to sell-off assets in order to refocus after going 
private.  
 
However, contrary to the financial distress costs model, we also find that private 
equity providers are more likely to be involved with firms that have been quoted for a 
shorter period of time. This suggests that these firms have become disenchanted with 
the market and wish to return to being private. However, we find no evidence that 
private equity providers are more likely to become involved with higher growth PTPs 
with free cash flow being insignificant.  
 
We find that private equity providers are more likely to be involved with higher Q 
PTPs. The mean Q ratio for private equity backed PTPs is less than one, 0.94, and for 
non-private equity backed PTPs it is 0.59. The means are significantly different at the 
1% level. This suggests that, although they have lower Q ratios than firms remaining 
public (their mean is 1.49), private equity providers deal with PTPs that have the 
highest Q ratios, but still, on average, less than one. The fact that the average Q is less 
than one offers some support for the financial distress costs model because the private 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 We also developed the analysis to differentiate between MBOs and non-MBOs. We find that MBOs 
are smaller, have better share performance, higher board ownership and higher debt. This provides 
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equity providers are involved in deals in which the assets are collateralized and could 
potentially provide a return in the event of financial distress. However, they are not 
involved with PTPs that have the lowest Q ratios and therefore the strongest asset 
collateralisation. This, as proposed, may reflect the willingness to trade-off some 
growth prospects for better asset collateralization. 
 
Among the control variables, private equity firms are significantly more likely to be 
involved in firms with lower internal board ownership. This suggests private equity 
firms can address agency problems in this type of ownership structure whereas in 
cases with higher internal board ownership, dominant entrenched entrepreneurs take 
the firm private as they are dissatisfied with the market. The other variables are 
insignificant further suggesting that neither the agency nor the financial distress costs 
models provide a comprehensive rationale for the involvement of private equity 
providers in PTP transactions. 
  
The overall results show that private equity providers are not likely to get involved 
with public-to-private transactions that are likely to run the risk of potential financial 
distress costs. Private equity providers appear to adopt a strategy of involvement in 
PTPs that offer the least degree of asset collateralization. They are involved with more 
diversified firms which offer greater opportunities for assets sales. This latter 
approach offers a means of generating returns when it may be difficult to refloat the 
company or find a trade buyer for the entire firm. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
limited evidence that MBOs are characterised by the desire to minimise financial distress costs. 
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As a robustness check we also carried out a multinomial logistic regression of private 
equity, non-private equity backed PTPs and matched firms remaining public. The 
results were similar. For space reasons, they are not reported here but are available 
from the authors.  
 
7. Pre and Post PTP Financial Distress 
In terms of the pre-PTP situation, we find that only three firms in the sample 
experienced financial distress. We find no evidence that private equity providers were 
interested in being involved with firms that were experiencing financial problems at 
the time of the decision to go private because they became involved in only one of the 
three transactions in which financial distress was present. Thus out of eighty one deals 
involving private equity providers, only one represented an additional risk at the time 
of the deal. The other two firms in financial distress at the time of the PTP were 
successfully turned around and were trading profitably after going private.  
 
In terms of post-PTP financial distress, Cotter and Peck (2001) found that 21.88% of 
their sample experienced financial distress within four years of the LBO and 28.13% 
within six years. We find only six firms experienced financial distress in the five years 
post-PTP. This means that 5.2% of deals involving firms going private may be said to 
have failed within five years, a much lower figure than found by Cotter and Peck. 
This may reflect differences in attitudes towards risk in the UK. Of these six, five 
involved private equity providers one did not. Thus 6.1% of deals involving private 
equity providers failed. Alternatively, 93.9% of the PTPs they were involved in may 
be regarded as successes, which suggests that private equity providers become 
involved in deals that offer a significant chance of success. This indicates that the 
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involvement of private equity providers may reduce financial distress costs, hence 
increasing the probability of a successful PTP transaction.  
 
We find that four of the PTPs that experienced financial distress involved MBOs, 
representing 4.3% of MBOs. Thus, again, there is evidence that where deals are 
completed, there is a high chance of success.  These results offer support for the 
financial distress costs theory because we find that MBOs are likely to succeed. The 
other two cases were management buy-ins, representing 9.1% of MBIs. This 
difference between MBOs and MBIs is expected since the latter are riskier 
transactions. Greater information asymmetries at the time of the deal may make it 
difficult to judge future financial distress, yet evidence shows that generally MBIs 
have a higher failure rate than MBOs (Wright, et al., 1995). 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has extended previous research on public-to-private buy-outs in a number 
of ways. We have extended the Opler and Titman (1993) potential financial distress 
costs model as an explanation for firms going private using a sample of firms in the 
different distress resolution environment of UK and covering a later period than that 
considered in earlier work.  
 
The analysis shows outcomes that are consistent with the financial distress costs 
model but there are also consistencies with the agency costs model, specifically in 
terms of the negative Q, the positive diversification variable and the positive 
interaction low Q and high diversification variables.  
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In terms of the variables that differentiate between the models, the results suggest that 
financial distress costs may not be central to the decision to go private. Contrary to 
expectations, firms going private experience poorer stock market performance in the 
year prior to going private. Firms going private are also more likely to be younger 
rather than older than firms that remain public. This is also contrary to the financial 
distress costs model and indicates a potential disenchantment with the market on the 
part of management.. In contrast to Opler and Titman, we find no evidence that firms 
going private spend less on R&D than firms remaining public. This may reflect the 
greater involvement of private equity firms in buy-outs in the UK than in the US and 
the relatively high level of innovative activity post buy-out (Wright, Thompson and 
Robbie, 1992).  
 
We extended previous analysis to consider the role of private equity providers. We 
find that private equity providers are more likely than non-private equity backers to be 
involved in PTPs in which the firm going private is more diversified, has a higher Q 
ratio, are younger and had lower board shareholdings. This suggests private equity 
firms target corporations where there is the scope to unbundle assets to recoup outlay 
on the investment and reduce the risk of not achieving minimum target rates of return. 
There is some anecdotal evidence that this is the case (CMBOR, 1999). The finding of 
a higher Q ratio in this context may be consistent with anticipations of significant 
growth prospects. This raises additional questions about the financial distress costs 
model because our results suggest that private equity providers do not consider the 
longer term when backing a PTP. One reason may be that their involvement is likely 
to be short enough to make a profitable exit before financial distress becomes an issue 
(Wright, et al., 1995). 
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With respect to comparisons with the court-based US environment, in the contract-
based resolution of distress context of the UK, we find that financial distress costs are 
potentially important and therefore may have a negative impact on the decision to go 
private. However, we do note some differences with US findings which may be 
attributable to the different bankruptcy regimes. In the UK contract-based system, 
knowing that any single creditor can exercise their rights may provide more effective 
monitoring than in the US where more creditor co-ordination is needed.  It may be 
that the UK system is more effective at either preventing or avoiding financial distress 
because any individual creditor can set the distress resolution process in motion. In 
the context of pre-PTP characteristics, this may mean that the power of would-be 
creditors may be influential in determining which deals are financed. To be less likely 
of becoming financially distressed, PTPs should have high levels of collateral and be 
more diversified, which we find. This is consistent with these types of PTPs being 
attractive to future creditors because it puts them in a strong position should they need 
to exercise their rights. Although numbers are small, support for this argument is 
suggested by the lower financial distress proportion in our sample (six cases, 5%) than 
found by Cotter and Peck (14 cases, 21.88%). 
 
It may be that in the UK the Q ratio is central to the decision to go private. Treating Q 
in terms of asset collateralisation may be more important from the perspective of the 
debt provider whereas the shareholder regards low Q as a sign of poor management 
and high agency costs. Further, Maupin et al (1984) suggested that managers involved 
in taking firms private interpreted Q as a measure of valuation rather than a measure 
of asset collateralization. The decision to go private may therefore be driven by the 
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perception that the market undervalues the company. There is also some anecdotal 
interview evidence from UK buy-out practitioners during this period that that they 
were targeting companies where this was the case (CMBOR, 1999). It would also be 
consistent with Zingales (1995) who argued that going public enabled the owner to 
retain an ownership stake that would maximize the value from its eventual sale. 
Clearly if the objective of going public was to increase personal wealth and the 
market was perceived as undervaluing a company, the owner would have an incentive 
to take it private again. This would also explain why firms going private had been 
quoted for a shorter time than firms remaining public. It would also explain why firms 
going private were smaller.  
 
The results suggest a number of further areas for research. First, the debt side of the 
transaction is something that has not been addressed. For example, what proportion of 
going private funding is provided by debt and what factors determine that proportion? 
Hence the final structure of the transaction may offer additional insights into the going 
private process. Second, there is a need for research that examines the extent to which 
private equity firms unbundle public-to-private management buy-outs by selling off 
surplus assets and how this impacts both failure rates and survival. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the sample 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
Diversified 
 
0 1.64 0.29 
FCF(%) 
 
-81.76 54.12 5.50 
Q  
 
-0.25 13.73 1.04 
Debt 
 
0 111.36 21.00 
Shareperformance 
 
-121.77 386.37 -9.91 
Tax 
 
0 18.28 2.47 
Q1Q2 
 
-0.05 4.95 1.04 
LQ*HFCF 
 
0 1 0.26 
LQ*HDIVERSIFIED 
 
0 1 0.27 
Size (£m) 
 
5.83 2578.57 899.49 
R&D (%) 
 
0 23.71 1.76 
Age (years) 
 
2 81 117.8 
BoardShare (%) 0.01 75.31 19.29 
 
 
Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity plus total debt minus cash in the 
balance sheet to the book value of assets. FCF is operating cash flow minus interest, 
tax and dividends deflated by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. 
Diversified is defined in terms of the entropy measure. Size is the book value of total 
assets R&D is research and development expenditure as a percentage of sales. 
BoardShare is the total equity holdings of the directors. Age is the number of years 
quoted on the London Stock Market. Q1Q2 is the Q ratio in the year before going 
private (at the last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year. 
LQ*HFCF is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had below median 
Q and above median free cash flow and zero otherwise. LQ*HDIVERSIFIED is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has below median Q and above 
median diversification and zero otherwise. Debt is the percentage of total debt 
deflated by total assets. Share Performance is the change in the share price minus the 
change in the FTSE All Share Index over the period one month prior to the 
announcement of the bid to twelve months before that. Tax is the percentage of sales 
paid in tax. 
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Table 2 
Univariate analysis comparing the characteristics of firms going private (n=115) with 
a random sample, matched by year, of those that remain public (n=115) 
 
Variable PTP Remaining 
Public 
t value z statistic 
Diversified 
 
0.32 0.31 0.26 0.13 
FCF (%) 
 
6.43 5.11 0.68 0.49 
Q  
 
0.83 1.40 2.72*** 2.48** 
Q1Q2 
 
0.90 1.14 2.86*** 1.25 
Debt (%) 
 
18.87 22.46 1.67* 1.50 
SharePerformance 
 
-20.62 0.79 3.25*** 3.13*** 
Tax (%) 
 
2.44 2.51 0.20 0.01 
Size (£m) 
 
130.42 928.72 3.53*** 2.92*** 
R&D (%) 
 
0.67 1.04 1.03 1.24 
LQ*HFCF 
 
0.26 0.27 0.14 0.14 
LQ*HDIVERSIFI
ED 
 
0.33 0.22 1.77* 1.76* 
Age (years) 
 
13.51 19.93 4.09*** 2.66*** 
BoardShare (%) 16.21 13.48 1.07 2.07** 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity plus total debt minus cash in the balance sheet to the 
book value of assets. FCF is operating cash flow minus interest, tax and dividends deflated by the 
market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Diversified is defined in terms of the entropy 
measure. Size is the book value of total assets R&D is research and development expenditure as a 
percentage of sales. BoardShare is the total equity holdings of the directors. Age is the number of years 
quoted on the London Stock Market. Q1Q2 is the Q ratio in the year before going private (at the last 
published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year. LQ*HFCF is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if a firm had below median Q and above median free cash flow and zero otherwise. 
LQ*HDIVERSIFIED is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has below median Q and 
above median diversification and zero otherwise. Debt is the percentage of total debt deflated by total 
assets. Share Performance is the change in the share price minus the change in the FTSE All Share 
Index over the period one month prior to the announcement of the bid to twelve months before that. 
Tax is the percentage of sales paid in tax. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
 Diversi
fied 
FCF R&D Q Size Debt Share 
perform
ance 
Tax Q1Q2 LQHF
CF 
LQHDIV
ERS 
Age 
Diversified             
FCF -0.15            
R&D 0.02 -
0.05 
          
Q -0.03 0.10 0.20          
Size 0.17 -
0.04 
0.01 0.0
1 
        
Debt -0.03 -0 
.05 
-0.02 0.1
2 
0.1
5 
       
SharePerfo
rmance 
-0.04 -
0.02 
-0.05 0.0
9 
0.0
4 
-
0.01 
      
Tax 0.18 -
0.09 
0.02 0.1
2 
0.0
2 
-
0.14 
-0.01      
Q1Q2 -0.02 -
0.05 
0.20 0.8
7 
0.0
1 
0.09 -0.07 0.09     
Lqhfcf -0.01 0.44 -0.07 -
0.2
3 
-
0.0
2 
-
0.16 
-0.04 -
0.04 
-0.15    
Lqhdivers 0.49 -
0.12 
-0.08 -
0.2
3 
0.0
1 
-
0.08 
-0.01 -
0.09 
-0.14 0.28   
Age 0.38 -
0.23 
-0.06 -
0.0
2 
0.1
7 
-
0.11 
0.01 -
0.02 
-0.02 0.05 0.25  
BoardShar
e 
-0.24 0.17 -0.05 -
0.0
6 
-
0.1
8 
-
0.09 
0.03 -
0.01 
-0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.22 
 
Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity plus total debt minus cash in the 
balance sheet to the book value of assets. FCF is operating cash flow minus interest, 
tax and dividends deflated by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. 
Diversified is defined in terms of the entropy measure. Size is the book value of total 
assets R&D is research and development expenditure as a percentage of sales. Board 
shareholdings is the total equity holdings of the directors. Age is the number of years 
quoted on the London Stock Market. Q1Q2 is the Q ratio in the year before going 
private (at the last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year. 
LQ*HFCF is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had below median 
Q and above median free cash flow and zero otherwise. LQ*HDIVERSIFIED is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has below median Q and above 
median diversification and zero otherwise. Debt is the percentage of total debt 
deflated by total assets. Share Performance is the change in the share price minus the 
change in the FTSE All Share Index over the period one month prior to the 
announcement of the bid to twelve months before that. Tax is the percentage of sales 
paid in tax. 
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Table 4 
Multivariate analysis of factors affecting the likelihood of firms going private (n=115) 
relative to a randomly drawn sample of firms that remained public (n=115). 
 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Diversified 1.1876 
(2.55)** 
 
1.3150 
(2.76)*** 
1.3002 
(2.89)*** 
 
FCF -0.0100 
(0.95) 
 
-0.0098 
(0.94) 
 -0.0061 
(0.59) 
R&D -0.0162 
(0.26) 
 
-0.0585 
(0.92) 
-0.0538 
(0.93) 
-0.0322 
(0.57) 
Q -0.8188 
(3.09)*** 
 
   
Size -0.3571 
(2.97)*** 
 
-0.3563 
(2.95)*** 
-0.3439 
(2.99)*** 
-0.2986 
(2.70)*** 
Debt -0.0133 
(1.33) 
 
-0.0168 
(1.75)* 
-0.0162 
(1.69)* 
-0.0145 
(1.52) 
SharePerformance -0.0088 
(2.37)** 
 
-0.0111 
(2.91)*** 
-0.0090 
(2.57)** 
-0.0101 
(2.72)*** 
Tax 0.0024 
(0.03) 
 
-0.0117 
90.18) 
-0.0519 
(0.81) 
-0.0079 
(0.12) 
Q1Q2  -0.9647 
(3.66)*** 
 
  
LQ*HFCF   -0.2047 
(0.63) 
 
 
LQ*HDIVERSIFIED    1.1150 
(3.04)*** 
 
Age -0.0749 
(4.33)*** 
 
-0.0812 
(4.59)*** 
-0.0634 
(4.00)*** 
-0.0619 
(3.90)*** 
BoardShare -0.0057 
(0.68) 
 
-0.0058 
(0.67) 
-0.0051 
(0.62) 
-0.0058 
(0.70) 
Constant 3.5598 
(4.83)*** 
 
3.9438 
(5.08)*** 
2.7094 
(4.14)*** 
2.8304 
(3.74)*** 
Chi square 61.92*** 65.92*** 49.87*** 51.08*** 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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t values in brackets 
 
Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity plus total debt minus cash in the 
balance sheet to the book value of assets. FCF is operating cash flow minus interest, 
tax and dividends deflated by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. 
Diversified is defined in terms of the entropy measure. Size is the natural log of total 
assets R&D is research and development expenditure as a percentage of sales. 
Boardshare is the total equity holdings of the directors. Age is the number of years 
quoted on the London Stock Market. Q1Q2 is the Q ratio in the year before going 
private (at the last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year. 
LQ*HFCF is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had below median 
Q and above median free cash flow and zero otherwise. LQ*HDIVERSIFIED is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has below median Q and above 
median diversification and zero otherwise. Debt is the percentage of total debt 
deflated by total assets. Share Performance is the change in the share price minus the 
change in the FTSE All Share Index over the period one month prior to the 
announcement of the bid to twelve months before that. Tax is the percentage of sales 
paid in tax. 
.  
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Table 5 
Factors affecting the choice of venture equity providers and the decision to go private 
(n=115 public-to-private transactions, 81 involved a private equity provider and 34 
did not). 
 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Diversified 1.2850 
(1.69)* 
 
1.2157 
(1.67)* 
1.2808 
(1.75)* 
 
FCF 0.0121 
(0.52) 
 
0.0093 
(0.43) 
 
 
0.0136 
(0.67) 
R&D 0.1226 
(0.69) 
 
0.1993 
(0.92) 
0.1968 
(0.84) 
0.2405 
(0.93) 
Q 1.6451 
(2.65)*** 
 
   
Size 0.2148 
(0.86) 
 
0.1161 
(0.50) 
0.0777 
(0.33) 
0.2374 
(1.03) 
Debt 0.0058 
(0.30) 
 
0.0156 
(0.85) 
0.1295 
(0.69) 
0.0134 
(0.74) 
SharePerformance 0.0034 
(0.47) 
 
0.0067 
(0.98) 
0.0066 
(0.98) 
0.0053 
(0.76) 
Tax 0.0752 
(0.46) 
 
0.1860 
(1.22) 
0.1998 
(1.28) 
0.1967 
(1.38) 
Q1Q2  0.1479 
(0.27) 
 
  
LQ*HFCF   -0.5952 
(1.12) 
 
 
LQ*HDIVERSIFIED    -0.4878 
(0.96) 
 
Age -0.0582 
(1.62) 
 
-0.0702 
(2.04)** 
-0.0634 
(1.83)* 
-0.0506 
(1.54) 
Boardshare -0.0422 
(3.18)*** 
 
-0.0402 
(3.15)*** 
-0.0376 
(2.99)*** 
-0.0413 
(3.27)*** 
Constant -0.3490 
(0.28) 
0.9632 
(0.81) 
1.3491 
(1.27) 
0.8022 
(0.79) 
Chi square 35.75*** 27.09*** 28.05*** 24.75*** 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
t values in brackets 
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Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity plus total debt minus cash in the 
balance sheet to the book value of assets. FCF is operating cash flow minus interest, 
tax and dividends deflated by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. 
Diversified is defined in terms of the entropy measure. Size is the natural log of total 
assets R&D is research and development expenditure as a percentage of sales. 
Boardshare is the total equity holdings of the directors. Age is the number of years 
quoted on the London Stock Market. Q1Q2 is the Q ratio in the year before going 
private (at the last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year. 
LQ*HFCF is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had below median 
Q and above median free cash flow and zero otherwise. LQ*HDIVERSIFIED is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has below median Q and above 
median diversification and zero otherwise. Debt is the percentage of total debt 
deflated by total assets. Share Performance is the change in the share price minus the 
change in the FTSE All Share Index over the period one month prior to the 
announcement of the bid to twelve months before thatTax is the percentage of sales 
paid in tax. 
 
 
